



## What do the Lingering Conflict and the West intervention in Ethiopia mean for Africa? A Snapshot Analysis

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### Abstract

*A burgeoning of literature and policy-related works dealing with conflict in the northern part of Ethiopia in general and Tigray in particular has emerged. A plethora of works most often deal with the local context in which the conflict-formation is witnessed through identifying the underlying causes, the manifold consequences, the narrations, as well as the role of external actors. Despite a growing emphasis on the topic, the wider implication the conflict poses to Africa has been given a marginal attention. This study therefore seeks to shed light to the conflict-setting in which the West intervention is highly visible and the manifold implication it has for Africa. To this end, the paper draws on different sources to generate data that inform the study. The study argues that the conflict unfolded in the northern part of Ethiopia and the concomitant West intervention should be seen through adopting a unique approach, that is, examining the implication for the wider region in terms of the degree of space given to African agency, the continuation of extra-continental intervention and the existing inter-state system.*

**Key words:** Africa; Ethiopia; Intervention; West

### 1. Introduction

In its long history of statehood, Ethiopia has never been immune to external intervention which often takes overt and or covert dimensions. Intervention, here, means any diplomatic and military acts by powerful state or a group of states to encroach on the sovereignty of the Ethiopian state to secure geopolitical interests. Hence, looking back to the country's modern history, the geopolitical position of the country is among the notable factors that has made Ethiopia's vulnerability, for instance, to the menace of colonialism and the subsequent cold war rivalry.<sup>1</sup> Over a long period of time, the Red Sea and the Nile River have attracted geopolitical rivalry among regional and extra-regional states.<sup>2</sup> The chief actors are Egypt,

<sup>1</sup> Abir, Mordechai. (1980). *Ethiopia and the Red Sea: The Rise and Decline of the Solomonian Dynastic and Muslim-European Rivalry in the Region*. Totowa, New Jersey: Cambridge University Press.

Mesfin Woldemariam. (1999). *The Horn of Africa: Conflict and Cooperation*. Addis Ababa: Commercial Printing Press.

<sup>2</sup> Belete Belachew. (2014). *Battle over the Nile: The Diplomatic Engagement between Ethiopia and Egypt, 1956-1991*. *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, 8(1&2):73-100.

Berouk Mesfin. (2012). *Ethiopia's Role and Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa*. *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, 6(1/2):87-113.

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The chief actors are Egypt, Gulf States<sup>3</sup>, the Russian Federation, China and America intent on achieving geopolitical interests. The intervening actor(s) has accustomed to use diplomatic, political, economic as well as military means at its wherewithal to secure geopolitical objectives. This condition in tandem with the domestic socio-economic and political malaise put the country in a precarious position. Vulnerability to external intervention is more acute when the country is not at peace with itself during instances of internal conflict as it had happened from 1960s through the early periods of 1990s.

Notwithstanding a narrowing political space and infringement on human rights, Ethiopia had enjoyed a relative political stability between 1991 and 1998. This state of affairs, however, seemed to be moved from bad to worse when the war on terror and the accompanied strategic and historical reasons manifested ensuing the September 11 attack against America. The outbreak of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea had further complicated the interstate system in the Horn and making the region and its constituent units more vulnerable to external intervention. Therefore, the intervention has exacerbated the hitherto conflict-ridden geopolitical milieu by supporting the local capacity of the conflict through channeling diplomatic, political and military support.<sup>4</sup> Soon after Ethiopia's rapprochement with Eritrea, a glimpse of hope prevailed regarding the overturn of tension pervading the region. Although the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018 relieved both states from staggering *no war no peace* situation that lasted for nearly two decades and its concomitant feature of intervention by proxy reciprocated against each other, the hope to address Ethiopia's vulnerability dissipated when the Tigray People's Liberation Front (hereafter the TPLF) has remained intransigent in its position vis-à-vis domestic and regional matters which later significantly affect the course of the conflict and the attendant effect of diplomatic and economic interventions felt beyond Ethiopia.

This paper starts by identifying the laying foundation that subsequently culminated into conflict. In this regard the causes of the conflict *inter alia* seem to have roots in the entrenched ethno-linguistic arrangement, the eruption of violent conflict across the country, the life-cycle of the ruling party, the attack against the northern command and the regional

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<sup>3</sup> Gulf States particularly refer to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates that have displayed increased involvement in the Horn of Africa. These countries are influencing the regional interstate relations while engaging to meet their economic, political, security as well as ideological interests.

<sup>4</sup> Bruton, B. (2010, March). *Somalia, a new approach*. Council Special report No. 52.

Menkhaus, K. (2007). *The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts*. *African Affairs*, 106(204), 357-390.

dynamics. Furthermore, the paper identifies the socio-economic and psychological consequences of the conflict drawing on the data generated from local and international reports. Then, the next section of the paper elucidates the implications of the unfolding conflict in the northern part of Ethiopia for the wider context that is Africa which is often paid little attention by policy-relevant works and in international relations literature as far as Ethiopia is concerned. Finally, concluding remark is drawn.

### **A Brief Antecedent to the Crisis**

Since 4 November 2020, Ethiopia has been plagued by violent conflict when forces loyal to the TPLF attacked the Northern Command of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (hereafter NCENDF). It is now marked fifteen months since the start of the conflict. Prior to the attack against the Northern Command, the looming danger of the conflict was anticipated as a result of the increasing deterioration of the relation between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the TPLF which was the *de facto* ruling party of the Tigray region. Indeed, it is still dominating the politico-security landscape of the region amidst an all-out war with the federal government. The two parties to the conflict have had divergent positions over the increasing violence in different quarters of the country, the transformation of the ruling party from the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (hereafter EPRDF) into Prosperity Party (hereafter PP), the election in Tigray as well as the normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Federal government and many observers attributed the rising of violence across the country over the past three years to the TPLF-EPRDF designed an ethno-linguistic arrangement and the TPLF's role of fanning the crises.<sup>5</sup> The hard-cores of the TPLF also viewed the cessation of hitherto hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea that last over a couple of decades as well as the change of the EPRDF into PP as strategies to further undermine the party's hegemony in Ethiopian body politics and the ruling party *per se*.<sup>6</sup> Such perception in tandem with the election in Tigray in defiance of the Federal Government further strained the relation between the two parties which subsequently graduated into crisis.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Mahmood Mamdani. (2019). *The Trouble with Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism*. *The New York Times*. January 2019.

<sup>6</sup> Bruton, Bronwyn. (2018). *Ethiopia and Eritrea have a common Enemy*. 12 July 2018. *Foreign Policy*.

<sup>7</sup> Yihenew Misrak Tsehay and Yayew Genet Chekol. (2021). *The 2020 Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) Regional Election in Ethiopia: Legitimacy and Motivations*. *Journal of Somali Studies*, 8(1):87-105

The simmering tension and the rhetoric accompanied thereof had proved the violent conflict was not only possible but imminent. Forces loyal to the TPLF's attack on the NCENDF were a triggering factor in the eruption of the conflict. Over a year, since the 4th of November 2020, the conflict started in Tigray which is the northern part of Ethiopia and has spread to the rest of Ethiopia, particularly the Amhara and Afar regional states. The conflict has brought devastating consequences to the lives of thousands of people as well as the physical infrastructures costing billions of dollars.<sup>8</sup> Significant geographical parts of northern Ethiopia has been suffered from the ongoing armed conflicts. A recent report released by the Amhara Regional State Planning Commission (APC) concerning the impacts of the conflict on the region is alarming. According to the Commission, "rebuilding the region would take at least 30 years".<sup>9</sup> The TPLF has also wreaked havoc to significant portions of the Afar Regional State. Apart from the overall damages inflicted on the private and public investments, the psychological and physical harm brought to the civilians of both regions is catastrophic. Furthermore, millions are displaced in both regional states as a result of the conflict according to OCHA's report.<sup>10</sup> Recent confirmed reports have shown the widespread atrocities committed in both regions. As the Amnesty International report attests, women were among the victims of sexual abuse. The report stated that women in Nifas Mewcha were being "raped at gunpoint, robbed, and subjected to physical and verbal assaults by TPLF fighters, who also destroyed and looted medical facilities in the town" they controlled.<sup>11</sup> This sexual and gender-based violence, according to the report, is "amount to war crimes, and potentially crimes against humanity. They defy morality or any iota of humanity".<sup>12</sup>

## Implications

As the conflict continues and the suffering of the people remains too, at worst, the lingering security problem will have hazardous consequences for the integrity of the state itself. Thus

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<sup>8</sup> This is to note that the lingering conflict has also brought consequences to the inhabitants of the Tigray Region.

<sup>9</sup> Ashenafi Endale. (2021). "Rebuilding region would take at least 30 years". *The Reporter*. 20 November 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/rebuilding-region-would-take-least-30-years>

<sup>10</sup> OCHA. (2021). *UNICEF Ethiopia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6 (includes Northern Ethiopia Response) – Reporting Period: July 2021. 1 September 2021*. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/unicef-ethiopia-humanitarian-situation-report-no-6-includes-northern-ethiopia>

<sup>11</sup> Amnesty International. (2021). *Ethiopia: Survivors of TPLF attack in Amhara describe gang rape, looting and physical assaults*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/11/ethiopia-survivors-of-tplf-attack-in-amhara-describe-gang-rape-looting-and-physical-assaults/>. 9 November 2021.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*

far, insurgents fighting the federal government, the TPLF, and OLF-*Shene*, desire not limited to the overthrowing of the incumbent government. The insurgents also seek a transition to a new political dispensation that could be a confederal or a loose federal arrangement along ethno-linguistic lines that is strange to administrative arrangements experimented in Africa and it would have a devastating effect on the rest of the continent because it would serve as a bad lesson to other states. This reminds what Mamdani<sup>13</sup> succinctly stated that such kind of arrangement threatened “to push the country [African states] toward an interethnic conflict” when groups are seeking to be represented by their ethnic identities and entangle themselves in deadly conflict to get access to resources.

To manage the political uncertainties developed over a year, two peacebuilding approaches have been pursued. The first one is an African Union-led peace initiative spearheaded by the then president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, who is currently serving as AU’s special envoy for the Horn of Africa region with the aim of “entrenching durable peace and stability within the Horn of Africa”.<sup>14</sup> The second one is the liberal interventionist strategy often offered by the West represented by USA and the European Union (hereafter EU) and the United Nations (hereafter UN). The former peace process in fact is guided by African solutions to African problems which pay respect to the wisdom of Africans to solve their problems without resorting to external actors. Furthermore, this practice adheres to the existing normative frameworks governing the interstate system in the continent: territorial integrity and sovereignty of African states.

Contrary to the AU-led peace process, there is a seemingly ‘liberal’ peace project intended to impose the West’s will on Ethiopia. This interventionist strategy the West often seeks to “use force or pressure to interfere with and exert power over the affairs of a weaker sovereign entity”<sup>15</sup>, particularly in Africa is commonly noticed in contemporary Ethiopia. The troubling sign of external pressure is increasingly manifested in the forms of frequent calling for the imposition of wider and selected sanctions, military intervention as well as economic

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<sup>13</sup> Mamdani, Mahmood. (2019). *The Trouble with Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism*. *The New York Times*. 3 January 2019

<sup>14</sup> African Union.(2021). *The Chairperson of the AU Commission appoints former President H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria as High Representative for the Horn of Africa*. Retrieved from <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa>

<sup>15</sup> Schmidt, Elizabeth.(2013). *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.pp.3

embargo.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, the West in different UN Security Council meetings<sup>17</sup> and the European Union have engaged to galvanize support behind their diplomatic position. As part of the diplomatic effort to put pressure on Addis Ababa, between 17 and 21 November 2021, Anthony Blinken visited three African states- Kenya, Senegal, and Nigeria- demonstrates that the intention is not only to upgrade American presence in the continent which is overshadowed by Chinese deep involvement in areas of diplomacy, investment, business as well as peace and security.<sup>18</sup> Ethiopia was always a topic from the subsequent press briefing by the chief of the state department. During his visit to Nairobi, Blinken says “We are gravely concerned about the escalating violence, the expansion of the fighting throughout the country and what we see a growing risk to the unity and to the integrity of the Ethiopian state”<sup>19</sup>. This is aimed at presenting the issue to get African states diplomatic support or neutralize their roles in the future activity of America. Likewise the US, the EU has also taken diplomatic path to coerce Ethiopia to accept the proposed demands.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, the West-backed peace-making activities have so far failed to get the recognition of the Addis Ababa government. It is rather viewed as lacking neutrality and politically motivated.<sup>21</sup>

Before the launching of an extensive campaign calling for intervention soon after the eruption of violent conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia and beyond that, the Biden administration put Ethiopia together with Yemen and Burma as geopolitical hotspot sites which need further attention. This was a starting point that signaled the subsequent terms of the administration's foreign policy towards Ethiopia, although many experts in the field of foreign policy have paid far less attention. The release of the document was of course happening at the early period of the

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<sup>16</sup> EUROACTIV.(2021).*Failure on Ethiopia sanctions 'my biggest frustration' this year, says EU's top diplomat.* Retrieved from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/africa/news/failure-on-ethiopia-sanctions-my-biggest-frustration-says-eus-top-diplomat/> .14 December 2021

<sup>17</sup> Security Council Report. (2021). *Ethiopia: Meeting under “Any Other Business”*. Retrieved from <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/12/ethiopia-meeting-under-any-other-business.php>. 19 December 2021.

Security Council Report. (2021). *Ethiopia Meeting*. Retrieved from <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/11/ethiopia-open-briefing-and-closed-consultations.php>. 5 November 2021.

<sup>18</sup> Shimm, David and Eisenman, Joshua. (2012). *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.

<sup>19</sup> Kelemen, Michele.(2021). *Antony Blinken starts his 3-nation visit to Africa in Kenya*. 17 November 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.wprl.org/post/antony-blinken-starts-his-3-nation-visit-africa-kenya>.

<sup>20</sup> Politico. (2021). *EU's Borrell criticizes countries over reaction to Ethiopia conflict*. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.eu/article/josep-borrell-criticizes-eu-for-reaction-to-ethiopia-killings/>. 28 December 2021.

<sup>21</sup> *Ethiopia: News - Ethiopia Rejects UN Rights Council Resolution, Calls EU Proposal 'Politically Motivated'*. Retrieved from <https://allafrica.com/stories/202107140369.html>

campaign of restoring the law and order of what the government said. The unfolding Western intervention in Ethiopia and its [un]intended consequences should be viewed in the context of the wider interstate system in Africa. If the West, particularly America, pushes their agenda further, they will do harm than otherwise. As we have witnessed in many military interventions in Africa and elsewhere so far, their failure is basically manifested in the failure of the state itself. The intervention ranging from diplomatic pressure to an outright sanction<sup>22</sup> which Ethiopia is currently facing will have great consequences for the rest of Africa in the following ways.

Firstly, the West and the frequent discussions concerning the lingering conflict and its consequences in Ethiopia on subsequent forums of international organizations such as the UNSC, the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the EU as well as the aspiration to invoke *overt* intervention in the country<sup>23</sup> mark the continuing tradition of extra-continental intervention in Africa to achieve the geopolitical and security interests. It is to be noted that the West intervention is hardly guided by altruistic motive. It is rather necessitated in large by their national interest calculation and the vested interest of their proxy in the region. This signifies the abysmal failure of the West's recognition of the agency of Africans to manage their own affairs. Accordingly, taking the current diplomatic position of America and its partners on Ethiopia, one would say that Africa is still prone to extra-continental<sup>24</sup> intervention which was common during the cold war period and thereafter. This state of affairs will invite other actors to entangle themselves in geopolitical rivalry to secure their interests. This could marginalize the continental organization, the African Union's, interest and role in mitigating the looming crisis. Needless to say, African solutions to the African problems (AfSol) are further crippled in part by the unfolding competition between dominant powers.

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<sup>22</sup> It should be noted that the threat of military intervention seems to be not excluded when one observes the recent talk of US General, William Zana, to BBC on the readiness of US troops in Djibouti to "respond to crisis". Again on November 23, 2021, officials in Washington expressed their interest to undertake a military mission on the ground of an increasing security concern in Ethiopia. This may signal that military intervention as an instrument of foreign policy could not be excluded from the equation. For further information look at BBC "Ethiopia's Tigray Conflict: US fears regional impact" 12 November 2021.

<sup>23</sup> Global News Net. (2021). *The European Parliament Adopts a 27-Points Resolution on Ethiopia, Calls for wide Range of Sanctions, including Arms Embargo*. Retrieved from <https://globenewsnet.com/news/joint-motion-for-a-resolution-european-parliament-resolution-on-the-humanitarian-situation-in-tigray-2021-2902rsp-the-european-parliament/> 8 October 2021.

<sup>24</sup> Schmidt, Elizabeth.(2013). *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Secondly, the conflict has increasingly got an African dimension where Ethiopia is waging war against the force of intervention spearheaded by the US, although no one is sure to what extent the discourse will remain dominant. The Ethiopian government has currently viewed the conflict as not just domestic affairs in which the war is fought between the state and the insurgents. Rather, the conflict and the concomitant discourse are between Ethiopia and the West while the latter is insisted on imposing its will. As a result, the conflict is increasingly portrayed as “an African war” wherein Ethiopia is battling the Western-backed insurgency to maintain its independent foreign policy course. Accordingly, the TPLF is widely recognized as a “Trojan Horse of US”. Since Ethiopia is still considered a beacon of freedom and a bastion of Black resistance against colonialism, challenging such intention and practices could be used as a lesson to other African states which are probably candidates for future adventure by the West.

In response to the mounting pressure, Ethiopian and Eritrean diaspora together with foreigners in North America, Europe and Africa have actively engaged in campaign activities. The demonstrators have publicly called for Hands off Ethiopia and # No More campaign. #No More campaign has crafted a space to challenge what the campaigners describe the hypocritical position of the Western media and their misrepresentation of the reality and spreading misinformation concerning conflict unfolding in the northern part of Ethiopia. The demonstrators have also publicly denounced the Western meddling into the internal affairs of Ethiopia through the slogan of Hands off Ethiopia. This campaign has increasingly garnered wider support from different quarters of Africa. This movement exposes the undue interference of the west spearheaded by America to impose their will on Ethiopia. And it is also targeting the intention of Ethiopia and Africa not willing to be the victim of liberal intervention which often leads to worsening the crisis that needs to be fixed as we have witnessed in Afghanistan and Libya. If this movement gets more support, it will embrace an African face. Furthermore, this circumstance may encourage the foreign policy establishment of African states to reassess their hitherto policy vis-à-vis the West as it was witnessed in the ongoing diplomatic wrangling between France and some of its former colonies in West Africa.

Thirdly, the biased position of the West vis-à-vis the conflict in Ethiopia will throw a shadow of uncertainty over a future relationship between Africa and the West. Thus far, the West has failed to publicly condemn the atrocities committed by insurgents in areas they controlled. In



fact, while closely scrutinizing the frequent statements made by representatives of the United States foreign policy establishment, it is not unusual to notice unconfirmed reports amid the call for the cessation of hostilities between parties to the conflict. Although the spokesperson of the US State Department reject the allegation out rightly, the chief of foreign relation of the TPLF's publicly asserted that America was encouraging the insurgent to expand militarily and capture the capital, Addis Ababa.<sup>25</sup> This situation will not dispel the claim that the West has maintained a biased position in the course of the conflict, notwithstanding a persistent call for cease-fire and peace talk amidst the conflict. This would be disadvantage to the future West's effort of settling dispute in the African security landscape which is still riddled by Ethiopian-type situation. Cognizant of the failure to deliver peace in Libya and other conflict-ridden states through the application of liberal intervention and the fact happening in Ethiopia, the West will not easily enjoy credibility in their future engagement on the parts of parties to the conflict in Africa.

Fourthly, the insurgents seek a new political dispensation that could be a confederal arrangement that is unfamiliar to administrative arrangements experimented in Africa and would have a devastating effect on the rest of the continent because of the following reasons. An attempt to experiment such kind of system is driven by ignoring the intricate nature of communal relations. Hence, this act is tantamount to releasing the genie from the bottle. The West approach to the Ethiopian problem is like missing the antidote to illness or aggravating the problem. It is also a wrong model to the rest of Africa which is mainly characterized by diverse societies. Moreover, if the US had remained stubborn in its diplomatic behavior, it could have had an effect on the regional state system which is complex. In my personal opinion, such unrestrained diplomatic stance could generate further conflict in the Horn of Africa and lay further foundation for the fragmentation of the delicate state to state relations. This could have implications for the US national security interests in the region such as the alleviation of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and international crime.<sup>26</sup>

Furthermore, the lingering security problem will not be limited to shake the integrity of the state *per se* insofar the West will not restraint from undue intervention and punitive measures and has pursued not carefully thought out policy. The unabated intervention and

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<sup>25</sup> VOA Amharic Service, 13 December 2021.

<sup>26</sup> Hanauer Larry and Morris J. Lyle. 2014. *Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions and Implications for U.S. Policy*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation.

misrepresentation of the reality by the West and the media conglomerates as foreign policy instrument have thus far further fanned the conflict. In fact, it could be difficult to downplay the concern of the West over the security problem in Ethiopia: the humanitarian concern, the possible refugee influx as a result of the continued war as well as the wider regional implication. Nevertheless, the unrestrained position or failed to revise it would augment the negative capacity of the conflict, thereby fueling the crisis and would engulf the Horn region wherein Ethiopia is its pivot. This behavior may even be detrimental to the short and long-term security interest of the West, although their foreign policy establishment often claim that they seek the stability of the region in part due to its proximity to the Middle East and serve as an adjacent to a conduit to the transportation of the bulk of commodities of the Red Sea.

### **Conclusions**

It is still remained a puzzle to close observers of US and EU foreign policy vis-à-vis the Horn of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular regarding their firm position concerning the current conflict in Ethiopia. To be sure, it is difficult to brush aside the extent of the West's vital national interest is at risk due to the ongoing crisis and the attendant security implications. Indeed, we couldn't isolate the current position of the US and the strategy it pursues vis-à-vis Ethiopia from a broader strategic competition prevailed between America and China and the former attempt to dampen China's influence in the region.

Manufacturing and nurturing the image that Ethiopia is slipping into chaos and collapse is frequently stated by both Brussels and Washington's officials who are closely monitoring the country's political development.<sup>27</sup> Such narrations could help America's future course of actions that would be taken against the government of Ethiopia without facing formidable resistances. Indeed, reproducing such narration would also help the foreign policy establishment principally in Washington to get the support of its partners and neutralize any possible stumbling block on its path to pursue carrots and sticks approach to advance its strategic interests. Nevertheless, a lasting solution to the unfolding conflicts in the Northern parts of Ethiopia could not be achieved via Western-sponsored peace initiatives that tend to

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<sup>27</sup> Nardelli, Alberto.2021.EU Sees Risk of Ethiopia's Disintegration Unless Cease-Fire Is Reached. Retrieved from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-16/eu-sees-risk-of-ethiopia-disintegration-unless-cease-fire-agreed>. 16 November 2021.

overlook the actual conditions happening on the ground. Rather, it may deepen the existing divisions and further worsen the situation. Thus, an African-led initiative that is working in accordance with the basic principles and values underpinning African Peace and Security Architecture and recognize African agency must be encouraged.

This study identifies the practice and the risks of intervention unfolded in Ethiopia and its implications for the wider region. First, it marks the continuing tradition of extra-continental intervention via sidelining and or undermining the African agency to deal with the crisis as it is witnessed in different corners of Africa bedeviled by political crisis. Second, the unfolding intervention has increasingly been viewed through African prism. Third, the liberal type intervention led by America vis-à-vis the conflict will pave the way for the questioning of the credibility of the West, given the fact that the humanitarian concern is a pretext for aggrandizing geopolitical objective perception has dominated the discourse. Finally, the way the conflict is mishandled will help the capacity of the insurgent to remain intransigent and exacerbate the crisis with security ramifications for the wider Horn region.

### Conflict of Interest

The author declared that there is no conflict of interest.

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